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I. INTRODUCTIONA S has been the case in recent years, we ventured outside of Texas
for cases, especially looking for the usually scarce LLC cases, for
this year's Survey. There are some notable cases, including a
couple that impose partner fiduciary liability on non-owners, and we've
covered a few cases for their nuggets of usefulness. Overall, it was an
interesting period.
II. FIDUCIARY DUTY
It has become common for limited partnerships to be organized with an
entity-currently, limited liability companies are popular-as the general
partner, to provide the general partner's owners with a shield from liabil-
ity for the general partner's obligations. There has always been the possi-
bility, albeit not likely in most situations, that the veil of the entity could
be pierced, resulting in liability for those owners who sought to be
shielded.' The next two cases are frightening reminders that determined
courts can find other ways to impose fiduciary duty liability.
FNFS Ltd. v. Harwood (In re Harwood),2 a bankruptcy case from the
Eastern District of Texas, concerned whether fiduciary duties were owed
to a limited partnership by an officer of the corporate general partner for
debts owed by the officer to the limited partnership. David Harwood
* B.A., Southern Methodist University (with high honors); J.D., University of Texas
(with honors). Attorney at Law, Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., San Antonio, Texas.
** B.S., University of Texas; J.D., California Western School of Law (with high hon-
ors). Attorney at Law, Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
1. See Faulkner v. Kornman (In re The Heritage Org., L.L.C.), 413 B.R. 438 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 2009) (discussed infra Section 1II).
2. 404 B.R. 366 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2009).
703
SMU LAW REVIEW
owned fifty percent of the stock of B&W Finance Co., Inc. (the Corpora-
tion), which owned a fifty-one percent interest in FNFS, Ltd. (the Part-
nership) as the Partnership's general partner.3 As the president and chief
operating officer of the Corporation, Harwood controlled the day-to-day
operations of the Corporation, which consisted exclusively of providing
executive and managerial services to the Partnership.4 Harwood, how-
ever, used that control to take Partnership funds for his personal use.
Although Harwood accounted for the withdrawals by executing promis-
sory notes to the Partnership, and securing them by giving deed of trust
liens on real property owned by him, Harwood never recorded the deeds
of trust in the real property records.5 The Partnership sued Harwood to
collect Harwood's debt, prompting him to file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy
protection. 6 The Partnership sought a determination that the debts owed
to it by Harwood were not dischargeable in bankruptcy because they
were debts resulting from a "defalcation while acting in a fiduciary
capacity." 7
In evaluating the plaintiffs' claims, the bankruptcy court first had to
decide whether, under Texas law, Harwood individually owed a "fiduci-
ary" duty to the Partnership within the meaning of the discharge excep-
tion for fiduciary fraud or defalcation.8 Citing Fifth Circuit analysis of
Texas law, the court held that a fiduciary duty exists if "the degree of
control actually exercised by a corporate officer over the actions of a cor-
porate general partner warrants a corresponding recognition of the fidu-
ciary responsibilities realistically assumed by that individual as to an
affected limited partnership entity."9 Applying that standard to the facts,
the court found that Harwood owed a fiduciary duty to the Partnership
because he directed the day-to-day activities of the Partnership in a
nearly autocratic manner.10
After deciding that Harwood owed a fiduciary duty to the Partnership,
the bankruptcy court held that Harwood's failure to ensure that the deeds
of trust securing his debts to the Partnership were properly recorded went
beyond a mere negligent breach of his fiduciary duty and constituted will-
ful neglect, thus amounting to a "defalcation while acting in a fiduciary
3. Id. at 377. It appears that the court assumed that B&W Finance Co, Inc., was a
Texas corporation and that FNFS, Ltd., was a Texas limited partnership, but the opinion is
silent on those things.
4. Id. at 378.
5. Id. at 378-79.
6. Id. at 382.
7. Id. at 382, 386, 392 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2004)).
8. See id. at 394-97.
9. Id. at 395-97 ("not only does Texas law impose a fiduciary duty upon a managing
partner of a limited partnership, but that it also imposes a fiduciary responsibility on the
managing partner of that managing partner in a two-tiered limited partnership arrange-
ment") (citing LSP Inv. P'ship v. Bennett (In re Bennett), 989 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1993)) .
10. Id. at 397 ("No one with daily involvement in either [the Corporation's or the
Partnership's] affairs could realistically challenge Harwood's authority or decision-making
with regard to either entity.").
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capacity."" Consequently, those debts were not dischargeable in the
bankruptcy proceeding, and the Partnership was entitled to recover the
outstanding amounts of the Harwood loans from the bankruptcy estate.12
It is concerning that courts feel so free to impose liability on persons
who are not owners, and who have acted in a representative capacity. It
is not so much that someone involved in self-dealing did not get what he
or she deserved (if that is what happened here); it is the precedent for
future matters that don't involve defalcation, and where, as here, a corpo-
rate officer can be found to have fiduciary duties to other parties (much
less to partners who are two-tiers-down remote).' 3
McBeth v. Carpenterl4 involved claims of fraud, breach of fiduciary
duty, and breach of contract, arising out of a failed land sale transac-
tion.'5 As with Mr. Harwood in In re Harwood, discussed above, this
case had a bad outcome for Mr. Carpenter, who was tagged with liability
individually, even though he acted in a representative capacity (as the
manager of a limited liability company that was a general partner, and as
the president of other limited liability companies that were general part-
ners of limited partnerships who were limited partners).16 If, taken with
Harwood, this decision suggests a trend, it is a disconcerting one.' 7
The procedural posture of the case-whether to overturn a jury verdict
on a motion for judgment as a matter of law18-may limit its future ef-
fect, which would be a good thing.' 9 The Fifth Circuit found sufficient
evidence in the record to support the jury's findings that the defendants
11. Id. at 399.
12. Id. at 399, 406-07.
13. On the surface, this feels like a "he can't do that and get away with it" result. Fine,
here, but lawyers and then courts will rely on this as precedent where the facts do not
support such a result.
14. 565 F.3d 171 (5th Cir. 2009).
15. Id. at 174-75. The case was in federal court because of diversity jurisdiction. The
breach of fiduciary duty claim is the only one of interest to us here.
16. Id. at 176, 178-79. The Fifth Circuit's inconsistent descriptions of Carpenter's sta-
tus and role was revealing. The first allusion in the opinion: "Carpenter signed the partner-
ship agreement as President of the general partner. . . ." Id. at 175 (emphasis added). Later
in the opinion: "Carpenter seeks to set aside the district court's judgment by arguing that
he owed Plaintiffs no fiduciary duty pursuant to the ... partnership agreement in which he
acted as general partner." Id. at 177 (emphasis added). Also, "[t]he [limited partnership]
agreement also contained Carpenter's signature as general partner on behalf of two other
entities serving as limited partners . . . ." Id. at 175. See below for more on this issue.
17. Again, the troublesome thing here is precedent. Determining that an individual
should be "punished" for putative misconduct, and in the process ignoring (especially with-
out in-depth analysis) legal structures and rules, is a very dangerous thing. Even if the
result in Bennett (see supra note 9) is conceded to be correct, it could and should be limited
to its facts-it is not nearly the stretch to say that one who, individually, is a general part-
ner and who has liability for the obligations of that limited partnership is liable as a fiduci-
ary to lower-tier limited partners, that it is to impose that liability on one not an owner who
is acting as the representative of an entity. And even Harwood had an element of "self-
dealing" that could be pointed to.
18. The Fifth Circuit said that reversing the jury's verdict was proper "only if no rea-
sonable jury could have arrived at the verdict." McBeth, 565 F.3d at 179 (quoting Steven-
son v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 327 F.3d 400, 405 (5th Cir. 2003)).
19. One example of the Fifth Circuit's perspective: "[W]e decline to disturb the jury's
verdict and affirm the district court's judgment." Id. at 177.
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breached their fiduciary duties. 20
Carpenter was sued by limited partners for breach of fiduciary duty but
not as a partner in any partnership. He was sued as the representative of
the general partner of a limited partnership, and as the representative of
a limited partner, for breaching duties owed to other limited partners.
Because it is unusual these days for an individual to take on the liability
of a general partner, without the interposed protection of a liability-
shielding entity, and because of the opinion's limited and inconsistent
treatment of the underlying facts, the authors contacted Carpenter's
counsel. We confirmed that Carpenter was not, individually, a general
partner or limited partner. 21 It is surprising that a court would invoke
partner status under partnership law to impose partner fiduciary breach
liability on an individual who was not a partner, without invoking a the-
ory such as "piercing the veil."
It was clear from the opinion that Carpenter was "the guy," in charge
of everything. In his testimony, he admitted that he made little or no
effort to identify which hat he was wearing at a given time.22 Of course, it
is not unusual for a single individual to be the driving force in a limited
partnership, whether acting as a representative of another entity or indi-
vidually. And it is not unusual for an individual acting in a representative
capacity to personalize the role by saying that "I am the general partner"
instead of the awkward "I am an officer or other representative of the
entity that is the general partner." The Fifth Circuit pointedly empha-
sized, and repeated, Carpenter's "control" over the activities of the busi-
ness, for the general partner and for the general partner of two limited
partners.23 Notwithstanding the procedural posture of the case, the Fifth
Circuit could have determined that the district court misapplied the law
in imposing liability on Carpenter, individually; instead, it determined
that the cases cited by the plaintiff were sufficient.
20. Id. at 179.
21. Carpenter's counsel forcefully argued in briefing to the Fifth Circuit, including in a
request for an en banc review, that unlike the facts in cases cited by the plaintiff, Carpenter
was not a partner. See infra note 23.
22. See McBeth, 565 F.3d at 178-79. The Fifth Circuit said that "Carpenter was often
quoted as making a point of telling all other partners that he was the general partner." Id.
at 178. Undoubtedly, Carpenter could have helped himself (on the issue of having liability
individually) by being more careful in his conduct.
23. Id. at 178. "Control" was the proffered underpinning for the Fifth Circuit's up-
holding the imposition of liability on Carpenter directly. See id. Carpenter's counsel made
the better (though unsuccessful) case, in drawing the distinction between the facts here and
those in Crenshaw v. Swenson, 611 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), and in LSP Inv. P'ship v. Bennett (In re Bennett), 989 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1993)
(where the defendants individually were general partners of the controlling entity), both
relied on by the plaintiffs and the court: "In contrast, Carpenter's actions which the Reyn-
olds vie to attempt to establish 'control' were merely the required action of the manager of
an LLC. [USCA 5 1017-10271. Reynolds 'control' argument would effectively set forth a
new expansion of Texas law and impose a personal fiduciary duty upon the manager of




The Fifth Circuit quickly disposed of two other issues-whether fiduci-
ary duties extend down the ownership chain to another tier and whether
limited partners owe fiduciary duties to other limited partners. 2 4 Again,
Carpenter came out on the short end, with the court finding Texas law
support for an affirmative finding on each issue.2 5
The case relied on by the Fifth Circuit for the proposition that "the
managing partner of a managing partner" owes fiduciary duties to lower-
tier limited partners was factually distinguishable, as was Crenshaw,
which the Bennett court discussed in great detail. 26 The Fifth Circuit re-
lied on both here.27 Among other things, Crenshaw involved an individ-
ual who was the general partner of a general partner, and who otherwise
had complete control over all partnership activities (and who would have
had general partner liability for the fiduciary breach committed by the
lower-tier general partner anyway). 2 8 In Bennett, the issue was whether a
second-tier-up individual general partner (again, not one acting in a rep-
resentative capacity, but an actual natural-person partner) could obtain a
discharge in bankruptcy. It was argued that he could not because he
breached fiduciary duties owed to lower-tier partners, which was equated
to "defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity" which must be shown
to deny a discharge. 2 9 Originally, the Fifth Circuit upheld the bankruptcy
court's grant of the discharge, on the grounds that whatever the duty, it
was not the express trust relationship required (vs. constructive trust) to
support defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.30 In that original
opinion, the Bennett court declined to extend Crenshaw to find that there
was an express trust relationship between the managing partner of the
managing partner of a limited partner, and the limited partners.31
That opinion was withdrawn on rehearing, and a new one substituted,
blazing new law in Texas. Relying on Crenshaw, the Fifth Circuit found
that the managing partner of a managing partner did owe fiduciary duties
to the limited partners of a limited partnership. 32 As previously noted,
and regardless of one's feelings about the correctness of that result, the
facts are distinguishable from those here-in both Crenshaw and Bennett,
the defendant found to have fiduciary duties to lower-tier partners was,
individually, a partner of the managing partner, which is not the case
here.
24. See McBeth, 565 F.3d at 177-79.
25. See id. at 177-78.
26. See Bennett, 989 F.2d at 787-90.
27. See McBeth, 565 F.3d at 177-79.
28. See Crenshaw v. Swenson, 611 S.W.2d 886, 888-92 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
29. Bennett, 989 F.3d at 783 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2010)).
30. See In re Bennett, 970 F.2d 138, 141, 149 (5th Cir. 1992) (opinion withdrawn on
rehearing).
31. Id. at 149.
32. Bennett, 989 F.2d at 790.
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The authority cited by the court for the proposition that limited part-
ners owed one another fiduciary duties was recent, but flimsy. In the
2007 Survey we wrote about Zinda v. McCann:
The partners might have pursued the argument that limited partners
do not, as such, owe fiduciary duties; apparently, there was no need
to do that in view of the overwhelming evidence otherwise in their
favor. In fact, it is not obvious that limited partners owe fiduciary
duties, as such, at least if they do not participate in control of the
partnership's business. 33
The other case cited to support finding limited partners liable to one
another as fiduciaries was Dunnagan v. Watson, another appellate case in
which, as here, the court was seeking support in the record for the lower
court's jury finding on the issue. 34 In the same 2007 Survey, we wrote,
after noting in the text that the Fort Worth Court of Appeals had found
fiduciary liability among limited partners:
Again, the number of hats worn by Watson make it difficult to say
with conviction which hat sunk the boat. The headnotes of the re-
porter suggest that it was a limited partner who owed duties to the
partnership in that capacity, but the opinion itself is much less clear
on that. Yes, that person was a limited partner, but it is not clear that
he was acting as such when his conduct resulted in breach of a duty.35
We are hopeful that the precedential value of this case will be limited
by its procedural posture. Issues as important as those addressed in this
case call for the utmost rigor by the courts that dispose of them. A valua-
ble practice tip may develop from this-having limited partners acknowl-
edge going in that Party X is acting in a representative capacity.
III. PIERCING THE VEIL
Faulkner v. Kornman (In re The Heritage Organization, L.L.C.), 3 6 an
adversary proceeding brought in connection with the Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy of a Delaware LLC, addresses, among other things, a party's abil-
ity to pierce the veil of a limited partnership. 37 The bankrupt LLC that is
the subject of this case, The Heritage Organization, L.L.C. (Heritage),
was owned by various member entities, including Delaware limited part-
nerships. In addition, several entities related to Heritage, also including
Delaware limited partnerships, supplied goods and services to Heritage. 38
The bankruptcy trustee brought this proceeding against the CEO of Heri-
tage (who directly or indirectly controlled essentially all of the member
and supplier entities, in addition to Heritage itself) and the member and
33. Steven A. Waters & Joel Iglesias, Partnerships, 60 SMU L. REV. 1217, 1220 n.26
(2007) [hereinafter Waters & Iglesias].
34. 204 S.W.3d 30 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied).
35. Waters & Iglesias, supra note 33, at 1222 n.46.
36. 413 B.R. 438 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009).
37. The goal of a veil-piercing effort is to make an owner, who is not otherwise respon-
sible for the obligations of a limited liability entity, liable for the obligations of that entity.
38. In re The Heritage, 413 B.R. at 456-57.
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supplier entities to (i) set aside distributions made to them, on fraudulent
transfer and preference theories, and (ii) to hold the CEO and the mem-
ber and supplier entities liable for Heritage's debts, on a veil-piercing
theory. 39
The bankruptcy court opened by noting that the trustee's veil-piercing
claims were based on two theories: "alter ego and sham to perpetrate
injustice." 40 After it reviewed relevant Delaware law,41 the court found
that Delaware law does not recognize a distinct "sham to perpetrate in-
justice" veil-piercing theory; instead, the "sham" analysis is merely one
component of the alter ego theory.42 Consequently, for the member and
supplier entities that were Delaware limited partnerships, the court con-
cluded that the bankruptcy trustee's claims must be evaluated solely
under an alter ego analysis. 43 However, after noting that current Dela-
ware law was unclear on the issue, the court held that the alter ego theory
cannot pierce the veil of a Delaware limited partnership to hold its lim-
ited partners liable for the partnership's debts, citing Texas appellate case
law4 4 and the similarities between the limited partnership statutes of Del-
aware and Texas to support its reasoning. 45 The court agreed with the
reasoning of Texas courts that a limited partner should be liable for the
partnership's debts only where the limited partner participates in the con-
trol of the partnership's business, as specifically provided by applicable
statutes.46
Schwab v. McDonald (In re LMcD, LLC),47 an adversary proceeding
that arose from the Chapter 7 bankruptcy of a Pennsylvania LLC, con-
cerned a bankruptcy trustee's efforts to pierce the veil of an LLC under
Pennsylvania law. LMcD, LLC, was formed by Kevin and Helen Mc-
Donald to showcase ice-carving artwork. The business was unsuccessful,
and the LLC sought Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. The Chapter 7
39. Id. at 459, 498, 509-10. Most of the decision analyzed whether distributions to
insiders of Heritage constituted "fraudulent transfers" that should be avoided under the
Bankruptcy Code and the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. See id. at 459-98. The
court found the distributions to be avoidable as fraudulent transfers or preferences. See id.
at 490, 501.
40. Id. at 510.
41. The court applied Delaware law, because Texas choice-of-law rules mandated fol-
lowing the law of the jurisdiction where the entity was formed, and the bankruptcy court
applied Texas choice-of-law provisions, as bankruptcy courts must apply the law of the
jurisdiction in which they sit. See id.
42. Id. Because the supplier entities included a Tennessee corporation and a Texas
corporation, the court performed a similar review of the laws in each of those states. Id. at
511. The court found that Tennessee law mirrors Delaware law (in that Tennessee courts
examine whether an entity was operated as a "sham" only as a component of the alter ego
theory), except that Texas law does recognize the "sham to perpetrate injustice" (or "sham
to perpetrate fraud") as a separate means of piercing the corporate veil. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 514 n.64 (citing Pinebrook Props. Ltd. v. Brookhaven Lake Prop. Owners
Ass'n, 77 S.W.3d 487 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied); Asshauer v. Wells Fargo
Foothill, 263 S.W.3d 468 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied).
45. Id.
46. Id. (citing DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-303(a), 17-303(b) (2008)).
47. 405 B.R. 555 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2009).
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trustee sued the McDonalds on a veil-piercing theory, seeking to hold
them, the members, liable for the debts of the LLC.4 8
In denying the trustee's veil-piercing claim, the bankruptcy court held
that the veil of a Pennsylvania LLC could not be pierced solely because
the LLC was undercapitalized. 49 The court was persuaded that the LLC
sufficiently adhered to company formalities by filing a certificate of or-
ganization, entering into a limited liability operating agreement, register-
ing a fictitious name for the LLC, applying for an employer identification
number, establishing a bank account, entering into a commercial lease,
obtaining a certificate of occupancy and a license to operate a public eat-
ing and drinking establishment, and filing tax returns.50 In addition, al-
though "there may have been an intermingling of identities" (that is,
many vendors and creditors doing business with the LLC could not differ-
entiate between the LLC and its members), there was no "commingling
of assets, financial records, or employees." 51 The members' direct pay-
ments at the LLC's liabilities did not constitute commingling of assets,
and there was no evidence that the LLC's funds were ever deposited into
a member's personal bank account. 52
This case was not a complete victory for the defendants, however. Be-
cause Kevin McDonald signed some of the LLC's contracts in his own
name, without identifying himself as a representative of the LLC, the
bankruptcy court found that was personally liable on those contracts.53
JNS Aviation, Inc. v. Nick Corp.54 is the successor to a bankruptcy case
covered in the 2008 Survey, in which a creditor was permitted, under
Texas law, to pierce the veil of a bankrupt LLC to hold its owners person-
ally liable for the LLC's debts.55 Despite the exceptionally unfavorable
facts set forth by the bankruptcy court in the prior case, the LLC owners
decided to appeal the decision. To no avail-the Northern District of
Texas affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling.56 The district court held
that the bankruptcy court properly applied the "sham to perpetrate
fraud" doctrine, correctly characterizing the Texas Business Corporation
Act as having added an "actual fraud" requirement to Texas veil-piercing
48. Id. at 559. This case also addressed the trustee's attempts to reverse-pierce the
corporate veil of a Pennsylvania corporation (also solely owned by the McDonalds), to
hold the corporation liable for the debts of the LLC through the McDonalds, as the corpo-
ration's shareholders (assuming that the McDonalds were liable for the LLC's debts on the
veil-piercing theory). Id. The trustee's reverse-piercing claims did not succeed. Id. at 564.
49. Id. at 560-61.
50. Id. at 561. These details are good reminders that there is an operational cost to
enjoying limited liability.
51. Id. at 562. It is awkward to constantly inform customers and vendors that, even
though they deal only with a natural person, they are doing business with an entity with
which that person is involved (as owner, representative, etc.).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 568. That is an appropriate outcome; indicating representative capacity on
contracts is Entity/Liability Protection 101 stuff.
54. 418 B.R. 898 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
55. See Steven A. Waters & Peter Christofferson, Partnerships, 61 SMU L. REV. 995,
1004-07 (2008) (discussing In re JNS Aviation, 376 B.R. 500 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007)).
56. JNS Aviation, 418 B.R. at 901.
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law in breach-of-contract suits, rather than having completely overturned
the line of Texas cases that developed Texas veil-piercing law.57 The dis-
trict court also held that the bankruptcy court did not err in finding actual
fraud by the owners of the LLC.5 8
IV. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Last year's Survey discussed the forerunner of the Olson v. Halvorsen
59 case, which for the first time addressed whether the statute of frauds
applies to the Delaware LLC Act.60 In Olson, the Supreme Court of Del-
aware affirmed the Court of Chancery's decision that the statute of frauds
applies to LLC agreements, reasoning that the statute of frauds and the
Delaware LLC Act can be construed together, and that the Delaware
legislature did not clearly intend for the LLC Act to preclude the applica-
tion of the statute of frauds.6'
V. ENTITY LIABILITY FOR OWNER'S DEBTS
Wilburgene, LLC v. Kwon (In re Wilburgene, LLC), 62 a bankruptcy
case from Utah, reminds us of the minimal qualifications required to be a
member of an LLC and takes quite an expansive view of a member's
ability to bind an LLC for his or her personal debts. While it does not
apply to Texas law, Texas has similar statutory provisions and this case
can be used as a guide when faced with entity liability for owner's debts.
Wilbur Sandbulte and Eugene Kwon formed Wilburgene, LLC, a Utah
limited liability company, to purchase a commercial building and lot in
Park City, Utah. Under its formation documents, the LLC was a mem-
ber-managed entity whose only members were Sandbulte and Kwon.
Sandbulte contributed $330,000 toward the purchase of real property;
Kwon made no monetary contribution. The LLC also borrowed money
from Zions First National Bank (Zions Bank) to pay the balance of the
purchase price for the real property, securing the loan with a first deed of
trust lien in favor of Zions Bank against the purchased property.63
Sometime after the real property purchase, a group of individuals, the
Blosch Group, made a personal loan to Kwon, evidenced by a promissory
57. Id. at 908 (citing TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(b) (Vernon 2009)). The
result is that Texas law now recognizes three veil-piercing theories: "alter ego," "use[ ] for
illegal purposes," and "sham to perpetrate a fraud." Id. at 907 (quoting Rimade Ltd. v.
Hubbard Enters., Inc., 388 F.3d 138, 143 (5th Cir. 2004)). The Texas Business Corporation
Act did remove "failure to observe corporate formalities" and "constructive fraud" as
available veil-piercing theories for a contract claim. Id. at 906-07 (quoting W. Horizontal
Drilling v. Jonnet Energy Corp., 11 F.3d 65, 68 (5th Cir. 1994)).
58. Id. at 908.
59. 986 A.2d 1150 (Del. 2009).
60. See Steven A. Waters & Bradley S. Carson, Partnerships, 62 SMU L. REv. 1345,
1349-50 (2009) (discussing Olson v. Halvorsen, No. 1884-VCL, 2008 WL 4661831 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 22, 2008)).
61. Olson, 986 A.2d at 1162.
62. 406 B.R. 558 (Bankr. D. Utah 2009).
63. Id. at 560-62.
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note signed by Kwon individually and on behalf of two other Kwon-con-
trolled entities unrelated to the LLC. The note was secured by a deed of
trust lien in favor of the Blosch Group, executed by Kwon as "manager"
of the LLC, pledging the LLC's real property as collateral for the Blosch
Group loan. The LLC was not a party to the promissory note, there was
no evidence that it benefited in any way from the loan to Kwon, and no
LLC member vote was taken to authorize the pledge of LLC real prop-
erty to the Blosch Group.64 Kwon later defaulted on the note, and the
Blosch Group moved to foreclose its lien against the LLC's real property.
The LLC and Sandbulte filed a state court action to prevent the foreclo-
sure. Kwon was then removed as a member of the LLC, as evidenced by
a member's resolution signed by Kwon,65 followed by the LLC's filing for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The state court action was removed to the bank-
ruptcy court.66
The plaintiff's first argument against the Blosch Group's enforcement
of its deed of trust was that Kwon had no authority to bind the LLC,
because, with no economic interest, he was not truly a member.67 The
bankruptcy court disagreed and held that, under Utah law, because Kwon
signed the LLC's operating agreement and articles of organization as a
member (and various other documents on behalf of the LLC as a mem-
ber or manager 68), he had to be regarded as a member, even though
"only Sandbulte [(i)] receive[d] income from the [LLC], [(ii)] ha[d] sole
control over the [LLC's] bank account, and [(iii)] would receive any and
all distributions upon dissolution" of the LLC, and Kwon never made any
capital contribution or other monetary investments in the LLC.6 9 The
court noted that Kwon could have contributed his services to the LLC,
and even if he provided no services, Kwon represented himself to the
public as a member of the LLC by "signing . .. the Articles of Organiza-
tion, the plat map, the tax letter, the loan documents with Zions Bank,
and the shareholders' resolution [that removed him] as a member."70 In
sum, it was not necessary that a person have an economic interest in the
LLC to be considered a member of the LLC.7'
The same is true under Texas law, which provides: "A person is not
required, as a condition to becoming a member of or acquiring a mem-
bership interest in a limited liability company, to: (1) make a contribution
to the company; (2) otherwise pay cash or transfer property to the com-
pany; or (3) assume an obligation to make a contribution or otherwise
64. Id. at 560-61.
65. Id. at 562.
66. Id. at 559.
67. Id. at 562.
68. Id. at 563. Despite the LLC's being member-managed, Kwon still signed some
documents, including the Blosch Group deed of trust, as "manager." Id. at 560-61.
69. Id. at 563-64.
70. Id. at 564. These things were delegated to Kwon and done without much oversight
by Sandbulte. Id. at 560.
71. See id. at 562.
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pay cash or transfer property to the company." 72 In addition, "[i]f one or
more persons own a membership interest in a limited liability company,
the company agreement may provide for a person to be admitted to the
company as a member without acquiring a membership interest in the
company."73
Arguing alternatively, the plaintiff contended that, even if Kwon was a
member of the LLC, his granting of the deed of trust to the Blosch Group
did not bind the LLC because he was not acting in the ordinary course of
the LLC's business. 7 4 In evaluating that claim, the bankruptcy court first
observed that, similar to Utah's partnership law, Utah's LLC law did in-
clude a general rule that a member's acts do not bind the LLC if not
apparently undertaken for carrying on, in the ordinary course, the com-
pany's business, unless authorized by the other members.75 However,
Utah's LLC law has an exception for a member's acts in transferring the
LLC's interest in real or personal property if the transferee "gives value
without knowledge of the lack of authority of the person who signs and
delivers the [conveyance] document," unless the articles of organization
expressly limit the member's authority.76 There was no such limitation
(express or otherwise) in the LLC's articles of organization.7 7
The LLC law of Texas includes a similar general rule, but does not have
an exception to the general rule for the giving of value in connection with
transfers of real or personal property. Under Texas law,
[an act committed by an agent of a limited liability company ... for
the purpose of apparently carrying out the ordinary course of busi-
ness of the company, including the execution of an instrument, docu-
ment, mortgage, or conveyance in the name of the company, binds
the company unless: (1) the agent does not have actual authority to
act for the company; and (2) the person with whom the agent is deal-
ing has knowledge of the agent's lack of actual authority.78
"An act committed by an agent of a limited liability company . .. that is
not apparently for carrying out the ordinary course of business of the
company binds the company only if the act is authorized in accordance
with this title."79 On the other hand, the partnership law of Texas in-
cludes an exception somewhat similar to that of Utah's LLC law, but only
for subsequent transferees: "A conveyance of real property by a partner
on behalf of the partnership not otherwise binding on the partnership
binds the partnership if the property has been conveyed by the grantee or
a person claiming through the grantee to a holder for value without
72. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.102(b) (Vernon 2009).
73. Id. § 101.102(c).
74. Wilburgene, LLC, 406 B.R. at 562 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-802(1)
(2008)).
75. Id. at 565.
76. Id. at 563, 565 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-802(3)) (emphasis added).
77. Wilburgene, LLC, 406 B.R. at 566.
78. TEX. Bus. ORGs. ANN. CODE § 101.254(b) (Vernon 2009).
79. Id. § 101.254(c).
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knowledge that the partner exceeded that partner's authority in making
the conveyance."80
After distinguishing between Utah's partnership and LLC laws, the
bankruptcy court answered whether the Blosch Group gave "value," for
purposes of applying the exception. Surprisingly, the court found that by
lending money to Kwon and refraining from taking any action against
him after his default, the Blosch Group gave "value" sufficient to permit
it to enforce the deed of trust against the LLC, so long as the Blosch
Group gave that value without knowledge of any limitation on Kwon's
authority to encumber the LLC's assets.8 ' The value need not be given to
the LLC itself.82 The court acknowledged that this was "an odd and
harsh ruling" but felt that it, nevertheless, was in harmony with Utah
law.83 Because the Texas provisions are similar to Utah's provisions,
practitioners in Texas should look to this outcome as a possible way Texas
courts would handle this situation.
VI. TAX
Garnett v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,84 a case from the United
States Tax Court, highlights some potentially important differences be-
tween limited partnerships, on the one hand, and LLCs and limited liabil-
ity partnerships, on the other hand, for federal income tax law purposes.
A married couple, Paul and Alicia Garnett, were found by the I.R.S. to
have underpaid their federal income taxes for three years. The deficiency
resulted from the I.R.S.'s disallowance of losses claimed in connection
with the couple's ownership of interests in various Iowa LLPs and LLCs.
The I.R.S. disallowed the losses as "passive activity losses" based on
§ 469(h)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, which treats losses from an
"interest in a limited partnership as a limited partner" as presumptively
passive.85
The issue in this case was whether the Garnetts held their LLP and
LLC "interests in limited partnerships 'as a limited partner,"' for pur-
poses of § 469(h)(2). 86 The tax court held that because owners of inter-
ests in LLPs and LLCs "are not barred by state law from materially
participating in the entities' business" (unlike limited partners in state law
80. Id. § 152.302(c).
81. Wilburgene, LLC, 406 B.R. at 566-67. The court did not say whether the Blosch
Group had knowledge of Kwon's lack of authority, or whether the required "knowledge"
includes constructive or inquiry knowledge or is limited to actual knowledge. Id. at 567.
82. Id.
83. Id. The court also justified its holding by reasoning that the LLC could have better
protected itself at formation by ensuring that Kwon was not a member, or by expressly
limiting Kwon's authority to sign documents. Id.
84. 132 T.C. No. 19, 2009 WL 1883965 (June 30, 2009).
85. Id. at *1-3 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 469(h)(2) (2005)). The Internal Revenue Code limits
an individual taxpayer's ability to deduct losses from certain passive activities-typically a
trade or business in which the taxpayer does not materially participate. Id. at *3 (citing
§ 469(a)(1), (c)(1)). "Material participation is defined generally as regular, continuous,
and substantial involvement in the business operations." Id. (citing § 469(h)(1)).
86. Id. at *4.
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limited partnerships), 7 they did not hold their interests as limited part-
ners.88 Therefore, their interests were not subject to § 469(h)(2), and
consequently, their losses in connection with these ownership interests
were not presumptively passive.
VII. PROCEDURE
In Urquhart v. Wertheimer,89 the United States District Court in Massa-
chusetts faced the question of who the necessary and indispensable par-
ties are in a federal diversity suit among partners of a limited partnership.
Robert Urquhart, a limited partner of Chelmsford Holding Limited Part-
nership, sued another limited partner and the general partner for breach-
ing the partnership agreement and common-law fiduciary duties.
Specifically, Urquhart alleged that the defendants "paid themselves ex-
cessive management fees, borrowed money in the name of the Partner-
ship for personal use, caused the partnership to lend money at below-
market interest rates, and commingled partnership funds with their
own." 90 The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure
to join the partnership as a necessary and indispensable party under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, because the claims were based on al-
leged harms to the partnership itself, which only indirectly resulted in
harm to the plaintiff.91 The effect of the court's ruling (that the partner-
ship was an indispensable party) is that a suit like the one here cannot be
brought in federal court. There is no federal issue to sustain jurisdiction,
and because the citizenship of a partnership for diversity purposes is de-
termined by the citizenship of each of its partners, the required diversity
is missing-the partnership automatically shares the citizenship of the
partner on the other side of the lawsuit (whether joined as a plaintiff or
defendant), defeating complete diversity.92
VIII. CONCLUSION
Time will tell, but some potentially important fiduciary duty cases were
decided during this year's Survey period. They did not advance the
state's jurisprudence, but if they are cited as precedent by future courts,
then they will become important. One can hope that they were isolated
aberrations and can be limited in their future application.
87. Id. at *7. Limited partners who so participate put their limited liability at risk. Id.
at *5.
88. Id. at *7-8.
89. 646 F. Supp. 2d 210 (D. Mass. 2009).
90. Id. at 212.
91. Id. at 212-13.
92. See id. at 212.
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